Public Unions & Collective Bargaining Thread....right or wrong?

[Henry Hawk]

 Here are some examples of WHY I think they suck!!!



No Volunteer Crossing Guards Allowed
A Wausau public employee union filed a grievance to prohibit a local volunteer from serving as a school crossing guard. The 86-year-old lives just two blocks away and serves everyday free of charge.

Principal Steve Miller says, "He said, you know, this gives me a reason to get up in the morning to come and help these kids in the neighborhood."

But for a local union that represents crossing guards, it isn't that simple. Representatives didn't want to go on camera but say if a crossing guard is needed, then one should be officially hired by the city.

Source: WAOW-TV, 1/27/10
  $6,000 Extra for Carrying a Pager
Some state employees, due to the nature of their positions, are required to carry pagers during off-duty hours in order to respond to emergency situations. Due to the collective bargaining agreements, these employees are compensated an extra five hours of pay each week, whether they are paged or not.

For an employee earning an average salary of $50,000 per year, this requirement can cost more than $6,000 in additional compensation.

Source: 2008-09 Agreement between the State of Wisconsin and AFSCME Council 24
 
Arbitrator Reinstates Porn-Watching Teacher
A Cedarburg school teacher was reinstated by an arbitrator after being fired for viewing pornography on a school computer. The school district ultimately succeeded in terminating the teacher only after taking the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court at great cost to the taxpayers.

Source: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 8/23/08
  'Outstanding First Year Teacher' Laid Off
Milwaukee Public Schools teacher Megan Sampson was laid off less than one week after being named Outstanding First Year Teacher by the Wisconsin Council of English Teachers. She lost her job because the collective bargaining agreement requires layoffs to be made based on seniority rather than merit.

Informed that her union had rejected a lower-cost health care plan, that still would have required zero contribution from teachers, Sampson said, "Given the opportunity, of course I would switch to a different plan to save my job, or the jobs of 10 other teachers.

Source: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 6/14/10
 
Union Opposes Cost-Saving Lawn Mowing Program
As a cost cutting measure, Racine County began using county inmates to cut the grass in medians and right-of-ways at no cost to the taxpayers. A county employee union filed a grievance indicating it was the right of government workers to cut the grass, even though it would cost the taxpayers dramatically more.

Source: Racine Journal Times, 5/12/10

  A Year's Worth of Pay for 30 Days of Work
Under the Green Bay School District's collectively bargained Emeritus Program, teachers can retire and receive a year's worth of salary for working only 30 days over a three year period. This is paid in addition to their already guaranteed pension and health care payouts.

Source: WLUK-TV, 3/3/11

  The $150,000 Bus Driver
In 2009, the City of Madison's highest paid employee was a bus driver who earned $159,258, including $109,892 in overtime, guaranteed by a collective bargaining agreement. In total, seven City of Madison bus drivers made more than $100,000 per year in 2009.

"That's the (drivers') contract," said Transit and Parking Commission Chairman Gary Poulson.

Source: Wisconsin State Journal, 2/7/10

  $150,000 Correctional Officers
Correctional Officer collective bargaining agreements allow officers a practice known as "sick leave stacking." Officers can call in sick for a shift, receiving 8 hours of sick pay, and then are allowed to work the very next shift, earning time-and-a-half for overtime. This results in the officer receiving 2.5 times his or her rate of pay, while still only working 8 hours.

In part because of these practices, 13 correctional officers made more than $100,000 in 2009, despite earning base wages of less than $60,000 per year. The officers received an average of $66,000 in overtime pay for an average annual salary of more than $123,000 with the highest paid receiving $151,181.

Source: Department of Corrections

Previously the Governors office released these examples of the fiscal impact of collective bargaining:

Paid-Time off for Union Activities
In Milwaukee County alone, because the union collectively bargained for paid time off, fourteen employees receive salary and benefits for doing union business. Of the fourteen, three are on full-time release for union business. Milwaukee County spent over $170,000 in salary alone for these employees to only participate in union activities such as collective bargaining.

Surrender of Management Rights
Because of collecting bargaining, unions have included provisions in employee contracts that have a direct fiscal impact such as not allowing management to schedule workers based on operational needs and requiring notice and approval by the union prior to scheduling changes. As County Executive Walker attempted to reduce work hours based on budget pressures and workload requirements by instituting a 35 hour work week to avoid layoffs, which the union opposed. Additionally, government cannot explore privatization of functions that could save taxpayers money.

WEA Trust
Currently many school districts participate in WEA trust because WEAC collectively bargains to get as many school districts across the state to participate in this union run health insurance plan as possible. Union leadership benefits from members participating in this plan. If school districts enrolled in the state employee health plan, it would save school districts up to $68 million per year. Beyond that if school districts had the flexibility to look for health insurance coverage outside of WEA trust or the state plan, additional savings would likely be realized.

Viagra for Teachers
The Milwaukee Teachers Education Association (MTEA) tried to use a policy established by collective bargaining to obtain health insurance coverage that specifically paid for Viagra. Cost to taxpayers is $786,000 a year.

Reference: http://abcnews.go.com/Health/milwaukee-schools-ban-viagra-teachers-union-sues-discrimination/story?id=11378595

Unrealistic Overtime Provisions
On a state level, the Department of Corrections allows correctional workers who call in sick to collect overtime if they work a shift on the exact same day. The specific provision that allows this to happen was collectively bargained for in their contract. Cost to taxpayers $4.8 million.

[Sandy Eggo]

So, do I go out and find numerous stories which give examples of what's right with unions? I'm not sure that would prove anything except what we already know, there's pros and cons.

[Henry Hawk]

So, do I go out and find numerous stories which give examples of what's right with unions? I'm not sure that would prove anything except what we already know, there's pros and cons.

I understand Sandy...I'm sure you could find some to support it.  But, when a State is facing a finanial crissis as WI is....

All Gov Walker is wanting to do is:


• Restricts public employees from negotiating everything except their wage

• Does not affect police and fire workers

• Limits wage increases to the rate of inflation

• Requires any larger wage increase to be approved by referendum

• Requires public employees to pay 5.8 percent of their pensions and 12 percent of their health care benefits

• Requires that collective bargaining units take annual votes to maintain certification as a union

• Prohibits employers from collecting union dues

• Releases members of collective bargaining units from dues paying requirements

• Authorizes restructuring of principal payments in the current budget for general obligation bonds, reducing debt payment costs by $165 million

• Increases general revenue for Medicaid to cover an estimated $153 million deficit

• Provides $22 million to address shortfalls in the prisons budget

• Authorizes the Department of Administration to sell state heating plants, with the net proceeds deposited in the budget stabilization fund

[Palehorse]

(Sorry all the pretty charts and graphs that provide visual confirmation of the text of this piece don't show up so well when copying and pasting). . . but you can view this article in its entirety here:

http://www.badforindiana.org/

EPI BRIEFING PAPER
EcoNomIc PolIcy INstItutE ● FEBRuARy 17,2011 ● BRIEFING PAPER #299
The
CompensaTion penalTy
of "righT-To-work" laws
By ElisE goulD anD HEiDi sHiErHolz
Recent proposals to advance so-called "right-to-work" (RTW) laws are being suggested in states as a way to boost economic growth. In this economic climate, something called right-to-work legislation sounds positive, but the name is misleading: these laws do not guarantee a job for anyone. In fact, they make it illegal for a group of unionized workers to negotiate a contract that requires each employee who enjoys the benefits of the contract terms to pay his or her share of costs for negotiating and policing the contract. This provision directly limits the financial viability of unions, reducing their strength and ability to negotiate favorable contracts, higher wages, and better benefits. Similarly, by diminishing union resources, an RTW law makes it more difficult for unions to provide a workers' voice on policy issues ranging from unemployment insurance to workers compensation, minimum wages, and other areas. The simple reality is that RTW laws undermine the resources that help workers bargain for better wages and benefits.
This briefing paper directly examines the impact of RTW on the wages and benefits received by workers, both union and nonunion. It does this by examining differences in the wages and benefits workers receive in RTW and non-RTW states. In a regression framework, we analyze the relation- ship between RTW status and wages and benefits after controlling for the demographic and job characteristics of workers, in addition to state-level economic conditions and cost-of-living differences across states. We find the following:
•   Wages in right-to-work states are 3.2% lower than those in non-RTW states, after controlling for a full complement of individual demographic and socio- economic variables as well as state macroeconomic indicators. Using the average wage in non-RTW states as the base ($22.11), the average full-time, full-year worker in an RTW state makes about $1,500 less annually than a similar worker in a non-RTW state.
Table of ConTenTs
background ............................................................................................2
How do RTW and non-RTW states compare? .........................2
What is the independent effect of right-to-work on wages? ..........................................................3
RTW status and employer-sponsored benefits .....................6 The necessity of rigorous methodology...................................8 Conclusions.............................................................................................8 appendix............................................................................................... 10
www.epi.org
Economic Policy institutE • 1333 H strEEt, nW • suitE 300, East toWEr • WasHington, Dc 20005 • 202.775.8810 • WWW.EPi.org
•   The rate of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is 2.6 percentage points lower in RTW states compared with non-RTW states, after controlling for individual, job, and state-level characteristics. If workers in non-RTW states were to receive ESI at this lower rate, 2 million fewer workers nationally would be covered.
•   The rate of employer-sponsored pensions is 4.8 per- centage points lower in RTW states, using the full complement of control variables in our regression model. If workers in non-RTW states were to receive pensions at this lower rate, 3.8 million fewer workers nationally would have pensions.
•   This briefing paper provides the most comprehensive study to date of the relationship between RTW status and compensation. Using a full set of explanatory variables, including state-level controls, it is clear that our analysis stands apart as being more rigorous than others of this type.
Our results apply not just to union members, but to all employees in a state. Where unions are strong, compensa- tion increases even for workers not covered by any union contract, as nonunion employers face competitive pressure to match union standards. Likewise, when unions are weakened by "right-to-work" laws, the impact is felt by all of a state's workers.
We measure the particular effects of RTW laws on com- pensation among workers who are not unionized or covered by union contracts. The wage penalty for nonunionized workers is 3.0%, and the benefit penalty is 2.8 percentage points and 5.3 percentage points for health and pension benefits, respectively. Our results suggest that proposals to advance RTW laws likely come at the expense of workers' wages and benefits, both within and outside of unions.
Background
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (1935) sanctioned a state's right to pass laws that prohibit unions from requiring a worker to pay dues, even when the worker is covered by a union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Within a couple of years of the amendment's passage, 12 states passed these so-
called "right-to-work" laws, as did many other states in the intervening years. Today, right-to-work laws are in place in 22 states, predominantly in the South and Southwest. (For a complete list of states that currently have RTW laws, see Appendix Table A1.)
Although there has been an extensive amount of research on the effect of right-to-work laws on union density, organizing efforts, and industrial development (see Moore 1998 and Moore and Newman 1985 for literature overviews), there has been surprisingly little examination of the perhaps more important issue of right-to-work laws’ effect on wages and even less on employer-sponsored benefits.
The limited amount of research that does examine the effect of right-to-work laws on wages can be divided into two areas: RTW laws' effect on union wage premiums, or the effect of these laws on overall wages. Our research focuses on the latter. Since right-to-work laws affect union density and effectiveness (Farber 1985), the effect of the union wage premium is not easily disentangled from the effects of RTW legislation. Our analysis tries to overcome the shortcomings in previous research in this area. First, we control for differences in cost of living throughout the United States, thereby making wages in various parts of the country as comparable as possible. Second, we measure the spillover effects of RTW legislation by examining wages and benefits of nonunionized workers.
how do rTw and
non-rTw states compare?
To determine the effect of right-to-work laws on wages, we estimate log wage equations using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey – Outgoing Rota- tion Group (CPS-ORG) for 2009. The sample consists of 108,627 workers, ages 18-64, who earn wages and salaries. About 37% of the sample lives in states with RTW laws. Average hourly wages are $20.91, and median hourly wages are $17.00.
Table 1 displays the characteristics of workers in both RTW and non-RTW states. On many levels, these two sets of workers are similar. The average age is nearly the same, as is the share of the workforce that is male and that is married. Educational attainment is similar, with workers in non-RTW states having slightly higher levels
EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011
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TaBle 1

of schooling. The racial/ethnic composition varies, with more white workers in non-RTW states, and more Afri- can American and Hispanic workers in RTW states.
The biggest difference between workers in RTW and non-RTW states is the fact that workers in non-RTW states are more than twice as likely to be in a union or protected by a union contract. Average hourly wages, the prime variable of interest, are 16% higher in non-RTW
states ($22.11 in non-RTW vs. $19.06 in RTW states). Median wages (not shown) are 14.4% higher in non- RTW states ($17.16 vs. $15.00).
what is the independent effect
of right-to-work on wages?
As shown in Table 1, there are differences between workers' characteristics in RTW and non-RTW states, and some of
EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011
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these characteristics will have a direct impact on workers' expected wages. For instance, workers in non-RTW states have somewhat higher levels of educational attainment, which is associated with higher wages, on average. Con- trolling for these factors in a multivariate regression model helps us factor in these differences, allowing us to come closer to identifying the "pure," or independent, RTW effect on wages.
In Table 2, we construct a regression model, starting with the most general and building up to a model that controls for the full range of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is always the natural log of hourly wage, and the variable of interest is an indicator variable taking on the value one when the worker lives in a RTW state and zero otherwise. (Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table A2.)
The results of the uncontrolled model mimic the differences in wages found in the descriptive statistics. Wages in RTW states are 13.7% lower than in non-RTW states. The basic set of controls includes the demo- graphic variables included in Table 1 – age, age squared, race/ethnicity, education indicators, sex, marital status, urbanicity, an indicator for being an hourly worker, an indicator for being a full-time worker – in addition to a worker's major industry and occupation. As with worker characteristics, the industry and occupation mix in the state could affect the average wage. Again, controlling for these differences allows us to better isolate the relation- ship between RTW states and wages. As expected, the
coefficient on the RTW indicator moves closer to zero, and wages in RTW states are found to be 9.1% lower, on average, after controlling for these worker differences.
The third column of Table 2 includes additional state- level variables on the economic conditions – measured by the state unemployment rate – and differences in cost of living across states. Averages for these three continuous variables are found at the bottom of Table 1. The Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) established a method that was used by researchers in the Census Bureau to calculate a cost-of-living adjustment to the hourly wage. PERI used Fair Market Rents, which consider housing and utilities prices, to construct a state-by-state cost-of-living adjustment. This measure (COL_PERI) creates an index of prices relative to the national average.
The second measure of cost of living (COL_MO) is based on data collected from the 3rd quarter of 2010 by the Missouri Economic Research and Information Center. The cost-of-living adjustment scale for each state is based on the average of the indices of cities in that state. As expected, New England, Alaska, Hawaii, and the West Coast are among the most expensive areas to live, while Midwest and Southern states continue to be some of the least expensive.
We include both indicators for cost of living in the full model because they measure costs slightly differently; how- ever, running this regression produces comparable results regardless of which one is used. Controlling for these price differences captures the extent to which higher costs, and
TaBle 2
Wage regressions: estimates of coefficient of right-to-work indicator (full sample)

EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011
● PagE 4
therefore higher wages may be found in non-RTW states for reasons other than their lack of RTW legislation, letting us better isolate the relationship between wages and RTW status.
As the methodology above attests, we have attempted as nearly as possible to isolate the impact of "right-to-work" legislation itself, apart from the myriad other factors that impact wages in a given state. All told, our model controls for 42 demographic, economic, geographic, and policy factors. After controlling for this full complement of dif- ferences, we find wages in RTW states to be statistically
and economically significantly lower than in non-RTW states. On average, "right-to-work" laws are associated with wages – for everyone, not just union members – that are 3.2% lower than they would be without such a law.
Beyond the overall impact of "right-to-work" laws on the workforce as a whole, it is important for policy makers to understand the particular effect such laws can have on specific communities within the state. To get at this question, we ran a series of regressions on demographic subgroups of the population. Here again we are looking at the relationship between RTW laws and wages in both
TaBle 3
Wage regressions on restricted samples: estimates of coefficient of right-to-work indicator
Model with no controls

EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011   ● PagE 5
the model without meaningful controls and the fully controlled model (comparable to column 3 in Table 2). In the model with no controls, it appears that male and female workers experience the same wage penalty, but after controlling for individual and state characteristics, we find that women's wages are penalized further (4.4%) in RTW states than men's (1.7%). The wage penalty exists across all categories of educational attainment and racial/ ethnic groups; however, we find that it is higher among nonwhites, with the RTW penalty being 4.8% for blacks and 4.4% for Hispanics.
It is particularly important to note that "right-to- work" laws have a statistically significant negative effect on the wages of nonunion workers, as shown in the last row of Table 3. Using the fully controlled regression model, our analysis indicates that nonunion workers in RTW states have wages that are 3.0% lower, on average, than their counterparts in non-RTW states.
rTw status and employer-sponsored benefits To determine the effect of right-to-work laws on employer- sponsored benefits, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey from March 2010, referring to full-year 2009 information.1 The sample consists of 21,834 employees, ages 18-64. As with the wage data, about 37%
of the sample lives in states with RTW laws. Examining this sample, we find that 69.7% of workers have employer- sponsored health insurance, and 42.1% have employer- sponsored pensions.2 In raw comparisons, about 4.5% more of the workforce is covered by employer-sponsored insurance in non-RTW states than in RTW states. Similarly, about 4.5% more of the workforce receives a pension through their job in non-RTW states than in RTW states.
We follow the same methodology as in the wage analysis, starting with a model with no controls and building up to one with a full set of controls. In addition to the overall cost-of-living measures, the health insurance regressions also include average family premiums within each state to further control for the effects of prices on the rate at which employers offer and employees take up these benefits. The key results are shown in Table 4 (with detailed regression results in Appendix Table A3).
As expected, the results of the uncontrolled model directly replicate the descriptive statistics that show benefit coverage is lower in RTW than non-RTW states. Workers' employer-sponsored health insurance coverage in RTW states is 4.5 percentage points lower and employer- sponsored pension coverage is 4.6 percentage points lower than among workers in non-RTW states. The full model confirms these results. After controlling for differences in prices across states as well as individual socioeconomic
TaBle 4
benefit regressions: estimates of coefficient of right-to-work indicator (full sample)

EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011
● PagE 6
characteristics, workers in RTW states, on average, are less likely to receive health insurance (by 2.6 percentage points) and pensions (by 4.8 percentage points) from employers. These estimates imply a much larger percentage drop in actual coverage, since coverage even in non-RTW states is far from universal: coverage of employer-sponsored
health insurance and pensions is, respectively, 71.5% and 44.9% in non-RTW states. Therefore, a 2.6 percentage- point estimated deterioration in health insurance coverage in non-RTW states implies a 3.8% reduction in coverage, or 2 million fewer covered workers. Likewise, a 4.8 per- centage-point estimated deterioration in pension coverage
TaBle 5
benefit regressions on restricted samples: estimates of coefficient of right-to-work indicator
Dependent variable: employer-sponsored health insurance
Dependent variable: employer-sponsored pension
sample
EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011   ● PagE 7
in non-RTW states implies a 12.1% reduction in pension coverage, or 3.8 million fewer workers with pensions.
Because the sample size is smaller in the benefit analysis, it is harder to conduct a detailed analysis for subgroups of the population. But some findings are clear and statis- tically significant: In this case, male and female workers in non-RTW states are equally more likely to have employer- sponsored benefits.
We find that RTW legislation has large spillover effects, that is, the legislation doesn't only affect unionized workers, but also those that lack union contract coverage. The coefficient of RTW for the nonunion subgroup is quite large: -2.8 percentage points for insurance and -5.3 per- centage points for pensions. This suggests that even among nonunion workers, living in a RTW state makes them less likely to enjoy valuable employer-sponsored benefits.
The necessity of
rigorous methodology
Tables 2 and 4 show that workers in RTW states have lower compensation, on average, than their counterparts in non-RTW states. How much of this difference can be attributed to RTW status itself? There is an inherent "endo- geneity" problem in any attempt to answer that question, namely that RTW and non-RTW states differ on a wide variety of measures that are also related to compensation, making it difficult to isolate the impact of RTW status. The approach we use to identify the independent effect on compensation of being in a RTW state is admittedly limited, but we do control for all of the many observable characteristics that are available in the CPS, including edu- cation, race/ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, union status, industry, occupation, urbanicity, whether a worker is an hourly worker, and whether a worker is a full-time worker. We also control for macroeconomic differences between states that may affect compensation packages, including cost-of-living measures and the unemployment rate. But despite our comprehensive set of observable controls, there may be unobservable state-level characteristics that lead to both lower average compensation packages and an increased likelihood of RTW legislation (for example, a broader political climate that puts workers at a disadvantage).
With these caveats, the analysis presented above is as close as rigorous social science can get to identifying
the specific impact of "right-to-work" laws on wages and benefits. In fact, almost all other studies on RTW fail to use such rigorous methods. For instance, in a report from the Indiana Chamber of Commerce Foundation, Vedder, Denhart, and Robe (2011) examine the effects of RTW legislation on income growth from 1977-2008. In our analysis, we include a full set of demographic variables, including race/ethnicity, gender, education, age, marital status, and metro area. Of this list, Vedder et al. control only for the change in college attainment. We control for work characteristics such as being in a union or having a union contract, hourly worker and full-time worker status, 12 major industry categories, and nine occupational classi- fications. Of this list, Vedder et al. only control for average proportion of employment in manufacturing. Both of our studies control for a labor force measure; ours is the unemployment rate, while Vedder et al. use the change in the employer-to-population ratio. They also include population growth, imperative for looking at changes over long spans of time when growth occurred unevenly across the country. We also control for two measures of cost of living, which captures the extent to which higher costs and therefore higher wages may be found in non-RTW states for reasons other than their lack of RTW legislation, letting us better isolate the relationship between wages and RTW status; Vedder et al. do not control for cost of living. Their remaining control variable is years that have elapsed since each state attained statehood, for which they offer no justification.
In short, we include the set of controls that the standard econometric practice demands in analyses of this type. Vedder et al. (2011) do not meet this standard, calling into question the validity of their analysis.3
Conclusions
Once we control for our comprehensive set of both individual and state-level observable characteristics, we find that the mean effect of working in a right-to-work state is a 3.2% reduction in wages for workers in these states. We also find a 2.6 and 4.8 percentage-point reduction in employer-sponsored health insurance and employer-sponsored pensions, respectively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the wage penalty for nonunionized workers is 3.0%, and the benefit penalty is 2.8 percentage
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points and 5.3 percentage points for health and pension benefits, respectively.
It is notoriously difficult to separate out the effect of a single public policy on wages across a statewide economy. It is possible that future data will enable even more exact measurements. However, our findings – that "right–to- work" laws are associated with significantly lower wages and reduced chances of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance and pensions – are based on the most rigorous statistical analysis currently possible. These findings
should discourage right-to-work policy initiatives. The fact is, while RTW legislation misleadingly sounds like a positive change in this weak economy, in reality the opportunity it gives workers is only that to work for lower wages and fewer benefits. For legislators dedicated to making policy on the basis of economic fact rather than ideological passion, our findings indicate that, contrary to the rhetoric of RTW proponents, the data show that workers in "right-to-work" states have lower compensa- tion – both union and nonunion workers alike.
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appendix
TaBle a1
Right to work states
alabama arizona arkansas florida georgia idaho iowa Kansas louisiana mississippi nebraska
souRcE: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division.
nevada north carolina north Dakota oklahoma south carolina south Dakota tennessee texas utah Virginia Wyoming
EPi BriEfing PaPEr #299 ● fEBruary 17, 2011   ● PagE 10
RTW indicator Union indicator White non-Hispanic Hispanic Asian Other race/ethnicity Male Some high school Some college Associate's degree College Advanced degree Age Age squared
TaBle a2

[Henry Hawk]

bump!

All Gov Walker is wanting to do is:


• Restricts public employees from negotiating everything except their wage

• Does not affect police and fire workers

• Limits wage increases to the rate of inflation

• Requires any larger wage increase to be approved by referendum

• Requires public employees to pay 5.8 percent of their pensions and 12 percent of their health care benefits

• Requires that collective bargaining units take annual votes to maintain certification as a union

• Prohibits employers from collecting union dues

• Releases members of collective bargaining units from dues paying requirements

• Authorizes restructuring of principal payments in the current budget for general obligation bonds, reducing debt payment costs by $165 million

• Increases general revenue for Medicaid to cover an estimated $153 million deficit

• Provides $22 million to address shortfalls in the prisons budget

• Authorizes the Department of Administration to sell state heating plants, with the net proceeds deposited in the budget stabilization fund.

[Palehorse]

Facts
Out‐of‐state special interest groups are pushing to pass a falsely‐labeled "right to work" law in Indiana. These groups claim such laws create economic prosperity, but many measures show Indiana's working families are better off than working families in states with RTW.
Wages
• On average, workers in states with RTW laws earn $5,538 a year less than workers in other states.
• Overall, union members earn 28 percent ($198) more per week than nonunion workers. Hispanic union members earn 50 percent ($258) more each week than nonunion Hispanics and African Americans earn 29 percent ($168) more each week if they are union members.
• Median weekly wages in 17 of the 22 states with these laws are lower than the $714 median wage in Indiana.
• Indiana's manufacturing workers earn $2.17 more an hour than the average manufacturing worker wage in states with "right to work" for less laws.

Higher Workplace Fatality Rates
• The rate of workplace deaths is 52.9 percent higher in states with RTW laws, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Health Care
• Indiana Workers are more likely to have insurance (14.2 percent are uninsured, compared with 16.7 percent in RTW states). So are our children (8.6 percent of Indiana children are uninsured, compared with 10.4 percent in states with these laws).
• Hoosiers are more likely to have job‐based health insurance than residents in 17 of the 22 states with RTW laws. Overall, 64.3 percent of us have job‐based health insurance, compared with 60.1 percent in states with these laws.
• Nationwide, 78 percent of private‐sector union workers have access to medical insurance through their jobs, compared with 51 percent of nonunion workers. And 77 percent of private‐sector union workers have 'access to guaranteed (defined‐benefit) retirement plans through their jobs, compared with just 20 percent of nonunion workers.
• Nationwide, only 2.9 percent of union workers are uninsured, compared with 14.2 percent of nonunion workers.
Pensions
• Indiana Workers are more likely to have pensions. Only 43 percent of private‐sector workers have employer‐provided pension coverage in RTW states, compared with 53.1 percent here in Indiana.
Education
• RTW states spend $2,671 less per pupil on elementary and secondary education than other states.
• Students here are more likely to be at grade level in math and reading. In Indiana, 35.1 percent of 8th grade students were proficient in math in 2007 (compared with 29.6 percent states with RTW laws) and 31.1 percent were proficient in reading (compared with 28.1 percent).
• States with these laws spend less to educate their children than we do in Indiana‐$9,005 on average for the 2008‐2009 school year, compared with $9,780 in Indiana.

http://www.union1.org/badforindiana/PDF%20Files/whatRTWmeanstoIUCI.pdf

[Palehorse]

New Research Counters Arguments for "Right-To-Work" Laws
Erin Johansson and Michael Wasser December 2010

The 1947 passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act allowed states to make it illegal for employers and unions to bargain agreements stipulating that all employees represented by a union had to pay dues. Without these agreements, unions are required to represent and negotiate on behalf of all the employees they represent, regardless of whether they choose to pay dues or decide to be "free riders." Since 1947, twenty-two states have passed RTW laws.
RTW laws don't generate jobs, economic growth
Proponents of RTW laws claim that they enable a more business-friendly environment and lead to economic growth for states and their residents.1 Yet recent studies rebut claims of economic growth and instead find that laws suppress wages. Lonnie Stevans, Professor of Information Technology and Quantitative Methods at Hofstra University, tested this claim by comparing the business formation and economic growth of RTW states with non-RTW states using recent data from the U.S. Small Business Administration.2 Stevans controlled for variables like education levels, population changes, and type of employment in the states to accurately measure the relationship between right-to-work laws and economic growth.
Stevans found that a state's RTW law:    Has no impact on economic growth
   Has no influence on employment    Has no influence on business capital formation (the ratio of firm 'births'
to the number of firms)    Is correlated with a decrease in wages
Stevans also found that the average real state GDP growth rate of RTW states is not significantly different than non-RTW states. Based on his analysis, he observed, "From a state's economic standpoint, being right-to-work yields little or no gain in employment and real economic growth."
Prior research on RTW employment growth was inaccurate
Charlene Kalenkoski and Donald Lacombe, professors in the Department of Economics at Ohio University, recently examined previous research claiming that RTW laws attract manufacturing employment to a state.3 Though prior studies have tried to measure the impact of RTW on employment, they failed to account for geographic characteristics such as natural or labor
1 Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions. (2010). Retrieved August 25, 2010, from National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. website, http://www.nrtw.org/en/b/rtw_faq.htm.
Frequently Asked Questions. (n.d.) Retrieved August 25, 2010, from National Right to Work Committee website, http://www.nrtwc.org/about/frequently-asked-questions/.
Johnson, R. et al. (2008). Is unionization the ticket to the middle class? The real economic effects of labor unions. Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
2 Stevans, L.K. (2009). The effect of endogenous right-to-work laws on business and economic conditions in the United States: A multivariate approach. Review of Law & Economics, 5(1), 595-612.
3 Kalenkoski, Charlene and Donald Lacombe. "Right-to-Work Laws and Manufacturing Employment: The Importance of Spatial Dependence," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Oct., 2006), pp. 402-418.
resources that also impact employment. When Kalenkoski and Lacombe measured the impact of RTW laws without accounting for a multitude of geographic factors, their estimates "dramatically overstate the positive relationship between RTW legislation and manufacturing employment." When they did control for geographic factors, they found RTW legislation is associated with only a slight increase in manufacturing employment, along with a decrease in employment in agriculture, fishing, mining and some service industries. They concluded that "improperly controlling for geographic factors can lead to incorrect inferences and misinform policy."
RTW laws lead to declines in workplace representation and wages
From the above studies, it's clear that passing a RTW law is not a path to saving your state's economy. Yet we know from many studies that RTW laws do lead to declines in union representation.4 According to one study, one-third of the difference in union representation rates between RTW and non-RTW states is attributable to RTW laws.5
With reduced collective power in the workplace, it's no surprise that RTW legislation leads to lower wages. Lonnie Stevans, as noted above, found that RTW laws are correlated with lower wages. Henry Farber, Professor of Economics at Princeton University, found that after Idaho passed a RTW law in 1985, there was a statistically-significant drop in nonunion wages relative to other states.6
Lawrence Mishel, President of the Economic Policy Institute, also measured the impact of RTW laws on wages.7 He found that workers living in RTW states earn 6.5% less than comparable workers living in non-RTW states. Even after controlling for regional costs of living, Mishel found that workers in RTW states earned less. He also found that for workers living in a RTW state on the border of a non-RTW state, being near a non-RTW state raises their wages.
If more states enact RTW laws, economic recovery is at risk
Our economy is dependent on consumer spending, and when workers don't have money in their pockets to spend, our economy suffers. According to recent remarks by Federal Reserve Chairmen Ben Bernanke, rising wages spur consumer spending and would "help sustain growth" in the economy.8 Yet if more states enact RTW legislation, research indicates that rather than generating more jobs, legislators risk depressing wages and impeding this economic recovery.
4 Hogler, Raymond, Steven Shulman and Stephan Weiler. 2004. "Right-to-Work Laws and Business Environments: An Analysis of State Labor Policy," Journal of Managerial Issues 16, No. 3: 289-304; Davis, Joe C., and John W. Huston. 1995. "Right-to-work laws and union density: New evidence from micro data," Journal of Labor Research 16:223-9; Garofalo, Gasper A., and Devinder M. Malhotra. 1992. "An integrated model of the economic effects of right-to-work laws," Journal of Labor Research 13:293- 305; Hirsch, Barry T. 1980. "The determinants of unionization: An analysis of inter-area differences," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33:147-61; Carroll, Thomas M. 1983. "Right-to-work laws do matter," Southern Economic Journal 50:494-509.
5 Garofalo, 1992. 6 Farber, H.S. 2005. "Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58(3): 335-352. 7 Mishel, Lawrence. 2001. "The Wage Penalty of Right-to-Work Laws," Economic Policy Institute <http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/datazone_rtw_index> 8 "Bernanke Says Rising Wages Will Lift Spending," New York Times, 2 Aug 2010.

http://www.union1.org/badforindiana/PDF%20Files/EPI-RTWReport2011.pdf

[Palehorse]

The 2006 Indiana Right to Work Campaign
January, 2006
Jeff Vincent
Indiana University Division of Labor Studies
© 2006 IU-ISLS
The 2006 Indiana Right to Work Campaign Introduction
For more than 50 years, there has been a concerted effort to attack unions in so-called "right to work" (RTW) campaigns. The union-only shop was outlawed in 1947 and ever since, the National Right to Work Committee (NRTWC) and other special interests have been trying to further limit voluntary negotiations between unions and employers. In theory, the regulatory framework under U.S. labor law assures that bargaining between unions and employers is conducted in good faith. In practice, RTW deliberately weakens this system.
RTW laws undermine the most basic principles of collective bargaining. RTW activists insist that individual preferences always supersede majority rule. Under U.S. labor law, individual workers already have specific rights. They do not have to join unions, nor do they have to cover the costs of a union's political, legislative, social or charitable activities. In the 22 RTW states however, the law encourages workers to avoid paying for any union operating costs. Since unions have a legal duty to represent all workers in the bargaining unit, detaching contract administration from financial obligations is nothing but a conscious effort to restrict their bargaining power.
For the last three years, NRTWC and other anti-union organizations have been campaigning for RTW legislation in Indiana. This recent political activism is the end result of a century-long strategy to advance the open-shop movement. A major part of this initiative in Indiana and elsewhere is thwarting worker rights. RTW activists tout the "economic freedom," of the individual as one of their core principles. But whose freedom of choice is really at stake?
RTW activists claim to speak for workers by denouncing unions. What is it about unions that they don't like? It's simple: Unions raise wages and improve the work environment. RTW promises a few greedy employers more power to dictate wage rates and job conditions. Special interest groups also want to maintain their financial stake in the multi-billion dollar "union avoidance" industry. In short, RTW is nothing more than anti-union strategy disguised as economic development legislation.
RTW in Indiana -1-
A Short History
Funded by an extensive and largely secret financial network, anti- union organizations have slowly been gaining political power. Organizations like the NRTWC spend millions of dollars promoting the kind of free enterprise rhetoric that existed when employers called all the shots and workers had no voice on the job. The open shop movement itself has a long history in the United States. In the early 20th century, the movement promoted sweatshops and fought unions in the name of business competition. Today's RTW activists use much of the same divisive rhetoric to defend their agenda.
By World War I, the National Association of Manufacturers was losing the battle of public opinion over sweatshops, so it tried to equate union activism with treason. A series of anti-union propaganda posters was widely distributed in 1917 under the guise of assisting the war effort.1   Entering the 1920s, some employers successfully marshaled the power of government to roll back worker rights that had advanced during the war. The open shop movement issued its American Plan, which declared that enlightened employers made unions unnecessary. The decade saw the formation of hundreds of open-shop associations across the US whose express purpose was to thwart union organizing.
In the wake of this assault, a steady decline in union membership marked the era. The economy of the early 1920's was prosperous and "welfare capitalism" was practiced in many industries. Under this theory, benevolent employers provided everything workers would want. In practice, employers of the period continued to discriminate against union members and also refused to recognize unions, even when a majority of workers were members.
After WWII, the open shop movement immediately set about challenging the political consensus responsible for the worker rights legislation of the New Deal. Aggressive bargaining had been curtailed during the war and disparities between wage rates and profits resulted in a wave of strikes. Long-standing anti-union sentiments fed claims that unions were too powerful. Employers and special
1 For examples see WHi(X3)21423 and WHi(X3)46665, iconographic collections, State Historical Society of Wisconsin. For a first person description of business opposition to sweatshop regulation see also Florence Kelly The Autobiography of Florence Kelley: Notes of 60 Years, Charles H. Kerr, 1986
RTW in Indiana -2-
interest groups renewed their efforts to shape anti-union ideas and symbols. Advertising and public relations budgets skyrocketed as business organizations sought to reframe anti-unionism in terms of the public interest.
Groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce spent a considerable amount of money on public relations convincing politicians that unions threatened free enterprise. Lobbying for passage of the Taft-Hartley Act cost the National Association of Manufacturers alone over $3 million. 2 Their propaganda campaign ultimately was successful and open shop agenda gained significant momentum with the passage of the Taft- Hartley Act in 1947. The movement turned to RTW legislation and has been active in various states ever since.
The precipitous decline in union density and bargaining power which began during the previous decade perhaps symbolizes the final break with favorable New Deal policies toward worker rights. The original federal labor policy embodied in the 1935 Wagner Act encouraged collective bargaining as a work organization strategy. As Roy Adams asserts, the abandonment of this principle should be cause for concern:
One common belief is that the Wagner Act failed because the majority of employees decided that they preferred individual to collective bargaining. To accept the statement as true one must hold that employees prefer not to be involved by right in the establishment of policies that critically affect their working lives. They prefer instead to defer to a greater authority. If that is true then we should not rest content with the demise of collective bargaining as many employment relations experts would have us do. A widespread deferral to authority suggests that we have a serious political problem. We have a citizenry with authoritarian attitudes, and if that is so the very foundations of our democracy are at risk.3
Misleading Claims about Economic Benefits
In 2005, the NRTWC circulated a classic "boilerplate" study in Indiana promoting a RTW law as one of the most effective economic development tools available to policymakers.4 The study claims that RTW is "a simple policy reform" and attempts to prove that income
2 Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor
and Liberalism 1945-1960 University of Illinois Press, 1994. In today's dollars this
amount would be the equivalent of more than $30 million.
3 Roy J. Adams, "Universal Joint Regulation: A Moral Imperative," Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1990
4 Boilerplate refers to a standardized template used repeatedly in other RTW campaigns, supplemented by economic data specific to the target state.
RTW in Indiana -3-
growth and expanded job opportunities are correlates of their anti- union agenda. 5 This agenda is captured succinctly in the report's primary economic claim that RTW laws "facilitate faster productivity growth, which is a key factor for improving employee earnings and employer profit."
The RTW literature makes no attempt to develop a systematic analysis of what workers themselves want and how their needs might differ from their employers. Instead, as the Indiana study declares, employers and workers benefit equally from "less burdensome taxes and bureaucratic red tape." This assertion appears to have a spurious correlation with RTW laws but is in fact, related to the effort to delegitimize union involvement in the employment relationship. The literature describing unions' impact on business competitiveness is ignored in favor of ideological assertions that an idealized meritocracy (where the employer unilaterally determines merit) is superior to collective bargaining for workers.
The NRTWC rhetoric against "Big Labor" and its association with "Bigger Government" are indicative of a specific bias based on political association. This approach is reflected in claims by the RTW ally, The Mackinac Institute, which argues that RTW forces union leaders to strive for "consensus" and direct negotiations toward their members' immediate interests.6 Drawing a similar conclusion, the Indiana study claims that RTW diminishes "union officials' ability to elect and reelect business hindering state and local politicians." By analogy, one might argue that individuals' voluntary tax contributions might force consensus among political leaders as well. However, in both cases, majority rule and the ability to vote incumbents out of office are direct and more effective methods of democratic representation.
State business climate rankings are another area where the special interests have promoted RTW. One of the tools used to attract new businesses to an area is the promotion of a favorable local "climate," i.e., specific factors thought to have an impact on site location decisions. The NRTWC's economic arguments are based on the rather nebulous claim that RTW policies are designed to create a friendly business climate. RTW assumes that non-union workers' lower wage rates create this more favorable climate.
5 Stan Greer, The Economic Benefits of an Indiana Right to Work Law, National Institute for Labor Relations Research, 2004 6 William T. Wilson The Effect of Right to Work Laws on Economic Development, 2002
RTW in Indiana -4-
Ideological biases against unions can be found in many business climate rankings. Promoting cheap labor is the main interest of RTW supporters when using these indexes. One group promoting RTW is the Pacific Research Institute (PRI) which produces the so- called U.S. Economic Freedom Index. The index supposedly measures "how friendly (or unfriendly) each state government is toward free enterprise and consumer choice." According to PRI, non- RTW states are "economically oppressive." 7
In one popular ranking, the Small Business Survival Index (SBSI), RTW is assumed to represent direct cost savings. The NRTWC goes so far as to assert that the SBSI "indicates that RTW status alone is an excellent predictor of overall business climate favorability." The SBSI is the creation of Raymond Keating, chief economist for the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council. The council was formerly called the Small Business Survival Committee. This name is now the title of the "activist and grassroots network" within SBSC, which claims 70,000 members. The council's mission is "to influence legislation and policies that help to create a favorable and productive environment for small businesses and entrepreneurship." They believe a union shop is one factor in "government-imposed or government-related costs impacting small businesses and entrepreneurs."
Keating believes that "unions are becoming obsolete." This vague assertion becomes a dubious statistical artifact in his index, which calculates the absence of a RTW law as a negative economic attribute. Keating states that the weakened role of unions in RTW states provides "a more dynamic, flexible workforce in the state, which translates into an amenable environment for increased productivity and improved efficiency."8 No evidence is offered to support this claim. In fact, the SBSO itself reveals the fallacy of this type of economic development thinking.
The actual state rankings on the SBSI do not remotely support the conclusions of the NRTWC. Indiana ranks 9th on the 2005 index. Also in the top 10 are non-RTW states Michigan (5), Washington (4), and Colorado (10). Most RTW states are ranked lower than Indiana on the SBSI index: South Carolina (12), Virginia (13), Tennessee (15), Arkansas (16), Arizona (17), Georgia (22), North Dakota (26), Oklahoma (29), Utah (30), Kansas (31), Nebraska (35), Louisiana (35), North Carolina (39) and Iowa (41).
7 Peter Fisher, Grading Places: What Do the Business Climate Rankings Really Tell Us? Economic Policy Institute, 2005 8 Available online: http://www.sbecouncil.org/FactOfWeek.asp?FormMode=Call&LinkType=Text&ID=65
RTW in Indiana -5-
Unions and Economic Development
The major data problem for RTW activists is their failure to articulate a robust theory explaining how weakening unions meets basic economic development goals. Indeed, these basic goals run counter to the RTW concept. Quite simply, economic development is a public good with a principal policy goal of producing a high and rising standard of living for all citizens.9 Adopting this theoretical perspective, at least one state business climate index reaches a very different conclusion about the role of workers in determining economic development strategies. The Work Environment Index (WEI), constructed by the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, ranks states in terms of working conditions. PERI researchers found "the various business indexes do not measure business climate in consistent ways and do not produce even broadly similar rankings from state to state." An effort to correlate working conditions with business climate indexes found that states with good working conditions also provide an attractive economic climate for business.10
State and local governments have a whole range of options for economic competitiveness that do not rely on cheap labor availability. Successful outcomes for of economic development policies can be evaluated by measuring expansion of business activity and job creation. The determinants of business activity are widely documented and play an important part in shaping economic development policies.
By contrast, the assessment of job creation most often involves a simple summation of the number of jobs in local labor markets. Just as business vitality cannot be determined by counting firms, counting jobs is an insufficient measure of economic health. Job factors related to wages and salaries, overall quality of work, stability of the skilled labor force or long-term productive capacity are not important policy considerations for RTW activists.
The availability of critical labor resources is highly dependent on factors of supply and demand in local labor markets. Competitive businesses are attracted to and grow in areas where the highest value productive inputs can be obtained. Workers invest time and
9 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Free Press 1990 10 James Heintz, Jeannette Wicks-Lim, Robert Pollin, Decent Work in America: The State by State Work Environment Index, 2005
RTW in Indiana -6-
money in education, anticipating this value being reflected in higher wages and salaries. Like other social contracts between workers and employers, this one stands on shaky ground.
While significant public investments are made to fund economic development activities, RTW policies represent a narrow and outdated strategy. They are based on thwarting worker rights and overtly favor capital over labor resources. RTW activists express a utopian optimism that their strategy will produce a high skill, high wage workforce. However, the RTW strategy does not necessarily provide positive net economic activity. Other labor resource factors which make important contributions to economic growth, especially high education and skill levels in the workforce, are inimical to low wage rates. Negative multiplier effects as a result of such strategies must be considered as well since once low wage workers are substituted for those earning higher wages, consumption and tax revenues decline. Wage rates are only one component of overall labor costs and it is likely that the unstable labor supply associated with low wages will increase inefficiencies and long-run costs.
Workers caught in the cycle of deindustrialization are advised to "go back to school." Vast resources are committed to support retraining but little attention is paid to market imbalances in terms of employer demand. The invisible hand of market forces does not raise the demand for skilled labor if the costs for individual employers outweigh the social benefits of training and education.11 Success in a global economy is dependent on the productivity of capital and labor resources. The economist Kenneth Arrow long ago recognized that the final outcome of any educational investments depended on the "cooperation" of the worker and private capital.12 By definition, every collective bargaining agreement represents a very specific and meaningful form of that cooperation.
The demarcation between managerial decision-making power and that of workers is a socio-historical process, not evidence of some natural law. Workers unquestionably have a stake in the health of any company and already hold considerable collective knowledge about the production process. Yet, they or their representatives seldom have any formal input on substantive business decisions. One
11 Joel Rogers, Vocational Training: Reflections on the European Experience and its Relevance for the U.S., Governor's Commission for a Quality Workforce (Wisconsin) 1990 12 Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Social Discount Rate" Cost Benefit Analysis of Manpower Policies, W. Donald Wood and Gerald G. Somers, eds., Industrial Relations Center, Queens University, 1969. See also, The Business Roundtable, Workforce Training and Development for U.S. Competitiveness, 1993.
RTW in Indiana -7-
of the strongest arguments against the RTW concept of unlimited management authority is that management doesn't know everything.
The marginalization of worker participation has far-reaching consequences and actually biases economic development policies in favor of low-skill, low-wage work. What is needed is an examination of new paradigms of worker and community participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of economic policy initiatives. Involving unions would represent a salutary departure from mainstream economic development practices.
If a rising standard of living is to be realized for everyone, Indiana's economic development policies must reflect the interests of a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Workers must be represented along with business and government organizations if high wage, high skill job creation will ever be realized. Unions remain a vital, if underutilized, competitive asset because they can give voice to ideas and concerns from workplaces and communities.13 The real challenge for contemporary economic policy is recognizing how worker decision-making can be built into the design and basic organization of work. If worker autonomy is truly valued over dependence, these policies will afford some manner of choice respecting production, including the development of skills and the use of technology. In all respects, RTW fails to do this.
What do the Data Show about RTW?
The NRTWC defines declining incomes as the economic policy problem facing Hoosier workers. However, RTW appears to be completely unrelated to the solution. Macroeconomic data show clearly and consistently that union workers earn more than their non- union counterparts. This fact is well known and is the reason why most workers indicate they would prefer a union job. Coercive measures to compel membership are not part of the union mission, despite the rhetoric of the RTW activists.
Are workers being misled by "Union Bosses?" More accurate explanations for the problem of declining incomes involve laissez- faire and other brutal doctrines of social darwinism that our society rejected long ago. But economic problems do not solve themselves. Long-term trends indicate that economic policies have been balanced on the backs of workers with little to show for it.
13 For a review of the literature see, Dale Belman, "Unions, the Quality of Labor Relations and Firm Performance," in Unions and Economic Competitiveness, Lawrence Mishel and Paula B. Voos, eds., M.E. Sharpe, 1992
RTW in Indiana -8-
Right to work legislation was a key component of the "southern strategy" of economic development. At one time, factories and jobs flowed from the north to the south because of comparative wage advantages. Even today, union membership is far lower in right to work states than elsewhere. So are wages and benefits for the average worker.
Whatever comparative wage advantages may have existed in the past, RTW states now are locked in the same process of deindustrialization that has decimated traditional middle-income union jobs. Manufacturing and information industries have traditionally provided higher wages and good benefits, so job losses in these sectors are worth noting. Even after a considerable amount of time has passed (60 years in some cases) RTW anti-union activism has not produced a favorable economic climate for workers. The data shown below clearly demonstrate this. As indicated below, RTW states are subject to the same forces of globalization as the union shop states. The RTW states are no more immune to deindustrialization than the rest of the U.S.
The adoption of a RTW law would be a fundamental step backwards for Indiana. Individual states cannot win the race to the bottom in terms of wages and working conditions. Union members, like all workers, are autonomous and independent citizens who are quite capable of protecting their own interests without the interference of RTW activists. Hoosier workers, left unhindered, will act to preserve the existing legal framework for union representation, something anathema to RTW. Rejecting RTW legislation creates an opportunity for labor, business and government to join together to solve the real problems Indiana workers face in the global economy.
RTW in Indiana -9-
Jobs Lost in Right to Work States 2002-2004
Date of   Manufacturing RTW Law   Jobs Lost
State %
Information Jobs Lost
%
Alabama   1953   15,504   5.0   2,885   8.4 Arizona   1947   7,408   4.0   3,967   7.6 Arkansas   1947   10,209   4.8   191   0.9 Florida   1944   17,519   4.3   10,561   5.9 Georgia   1947   19,154   4.1   12,942   9.8 Idaho   1986   3,145   4.9   +778   +8.5 Iowa   1947   4,334   1.9   1,562   4.4 Kansas   1958   4,575   2.5   9,082   17.9 Louisiana   1976   8,749   5.4   +703   +2.4 Mississippi   1954   8,445   4.5   1,498   9.3 Nebraska   1947   4,552   4.3   3,245   13.1 Nevada   1951   +3,192   +7.5   2,076   12.2 North Carolina   1947   63,787   9.9   6,560   8.3 North Dakota   1947   +895   3.8   230   2.9 Oklahoma   2001   9.762   6.4   3,749   10.6 South Carolina   1954   22,681   7.8   1,896   6.7 South Dakota   1947   +471   +1.2   78   1.1 Tennessee   1947   15,722   3.7   2,935   5.7 Texas   1947   60,235   6.3   23,043   9.3 Utah   1955   +837   +0.7   792   2.7 Virginia   1947   22,188   6.9   5,582   5.3 Wyoming   1963   Not available   -   not available   -
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
RTW in Indiana -10-
Workers Lose Wages Under Right to Work
$800
A $700
v
e r $600
a g e $500
W e $400 e k
l $300 y
W $200 a
g e $100
$0
Union States RTW States
All Workers
Women Workers
Black/African American Workers
Hispanic/Latino Workers
Asian Workers
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
RTW in Indiana -11-
Workers Lose Wages in Right to Work States
$740 $720 $700 $680
Average Weekly $660
Wage
$640 $620 $600 $580 $560
Union Shop States
RTW States
Indiana
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Families Lose Income in Right to Work States
Median Family Income
$58,000 $56,000 $54,000 $52,000 $50,000 $48,000 $46,000 $44,000
Union Shop States
RTW States
Indiana
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
RTW in Indiana -12-
What Workers Lose Under Right to Work
17.3%
16.8%
18.0%
17.5%
17.0%
16.5%
16.0%
15.5%
15.0%
Weekly Wage Cut
Annual Family Income Loss
Estimates based on Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
RTW in Indiana -13-
Economic Activity is Lower in Right to Work States
Average Gross State Product (in billions)
$250
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
Union Shop States
RTW States
Indiana
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
RTW in Indiana -14-
Basic Living Standards are Lower in Right to Work States
90% 89% 88% 87% 86% 85% 84% 83% 82% 81% 80%
Union Shop States RTW States Indiana
Above Poverty
Health Insurance Coverage
HS Education or Above
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
RTW in Indiana -15-

http://www.union1.org/badforindiana/PDF%20Files/2006%20IN%20RTW%20Campaign.pdf

[Henry Hawk]

bump!

All Gov Walker is wanting to do is:


• Restricts public employees from negotiating everything except their wage

• Does not affect police and fire workers

• Limits wage increases to the rate of inflation

• Requires any larger wage increase to be approved by referendum

• Requires public employees to pay 5.8 percent of their pensions and 12 percent of their health care benefits

• Requires that collective bargaining units take annual votes to maintain certification as a union

• Prohibits employers from collecting union dues

• Releases members of collective bargaining units from dues paying requirements

• Authorizes restructuring of principal payments in the current budget for general obligation bonds, reducing debt payment costs by $165 million

• Increases general revenue for Medicaid to cover an estimated $153 million deficit

• Provides $22 million to address shortfalls in the prisons budget

• Authorizes the Department of Administration to sell state heating plants, with the net proceeds deposited in the budget stabilization fund.

[Palehorse]

http://www.union1.org/badforindiana/PDF%20Files/RTWDataZone.pdf
The Wage Penalty of "Right-to-Work" Laws
by Lawrence Mishel
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (1935) sanctioned a state's right to pass laws that prohibit unions from requiring a worker to pay dues, even when the worker is covered by a union -negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Within a couple of years of the ammendment's passage, 12 states passed these so-called "right-to-
work" (RTW) laws, as did many other states in the intervening years.1 Although there has been an extensive amount of research on the effect of right-to-work laws on union density, organizing efforts, and industrial development (see Moore (1998) and Moore and Newman (1985) for literature overviews), there has been surprisingly little examination of the perhaps more important issue of right-to-work laws' effect on wages.
The limited amount of research that does examine the effect of right -to -work laws on wages can be divided into two areas: RTW laws effects on union wage premiums or the average effects of these laws on wages. Our research focuses on the latter. Since right -to-work laws affect union density and effectiveness (Farber 1985), the effect of the union wage premium is not easily disentangled from the effects of RTW legislation. Our analysis tried to overcome the shortcomings in previous research in this area. First, we control for differences in cost of living throughout the United States, thereby making comparable wages in various parts of the country. Secondly, we examine how metropolitan areas located in both right-to-work and non-right-to-work states affect wages.
We find that the mean effect of working in a right -to-work state results in a 6% to 8% reduction in wages for workers in these states, with an average wage penalty of 6.5%. Controlling for regional costs of living reduces this amount to approximately 4%. We find that previous research reporting real wage gains associated with right-to-work states is almost purely the result of border cities that benefit from their proximity to a non-RTW state.
Data and Analysis
To determine the effect of right -to-work laws on wages we estimate log wage equations using the Bureau of Labor Statistic's current population survey- outgoing rotation group (CPS-ORG) data for 2000. The sample consists of 152,576 prime age workers, ages 18 -64, who earn wages or salaries. Average hourly wages for the sample were $15.54, and median hourly wages were $12.25. Median wages for workers living in right -to-work states were $11.45, while wages for those living in non -RTW states were $13.00, indicating that wages were 11.9% lower in RTW states.
Whether this wage disadvantage in these states is due to RTW laws can only be determined by controlling for other characteristics. To this end, we specify wage regressions (Model 1) that control for the following personal and geographic characteristics: race/ethnicity, age, age squared, marital status, sex, education, urbanicity, employed full-time, hourly worker, union status, industry (22 categories), and occupation (13 categories). A second set of regression results (Model 2) controls for state of residence, which should
The Wage Penalty of "Right-to-Work" Laws | EPI DataZone
control all the characteristics of a state-other than its RTW status-that differ from other states, including cost-of-living. A third set of results (Model 3)
controls for differences in intra-state and inter-state costs of living. 2 Our regression results follow Dumond, Hirsch, and MacPherson's (1999) specification of the regional cost of living controls. However, we have limited confidence in these estimates, since there is no universally accepted method of adjusting for regional costs of living, and it is impossible to test the accuracy of using an index based on fair market rents. In each model the mean effect is estimated using a simple indicator variable for right-to-work states.
Our first set of regression results indicate that workers living in right -to -work states earn 6.5% less than comparable workers in non-RTW states. This regression model essentially compares workers with similar demographics (education, age, race, etc.) and occupations within an industry across the two types of states, those with RTW laws and those without. The second regression model controls for different state effects not captured by industry and occupation, partially capturing price differences between states. These results indicate that a worker living in a right-to-work state earns, on average, 7.8% less than a comparable worker in a non-RTW state. The final regression model compares workers with similar demographic, industry and occupations but also controls for cost of living using an index of the fair market rents. These results indicate that, on average, a worker living in a right -to -work state earns 3.8 % less than a worker living in a non -RTW state. Estimates from this last regression model, however, are suspect given the lack of an established series for controlling for regional, inter-state, or intra-state costs of living (see Table 1). Our best estimate is that workers living in right-to-work states earn, on average, 6.5% less than similar workers in non-RTW states.
An analysis along gender lines reveals similar trends. On average, men in RTW states earn 7.8% less than their counterparts in non-RTW states; women in RTW states earn 6.8% less (Table 2).
Unlike previous research by Bennett (2001), we find that, even after controlling for regional costs of living, workers in right -to-work states earn less per hour. Particularly interesting is the affect on workers living in cities that are stretch across state line, placing it in both a right-to-work state and a non-RTW state. Seventeen out of 433 metropolitan areas in our sample (nearly 4%) spill over from a right-to-work state to a non-RTW state. Our analysis indicates that, in areas where a pure RTW state effect exists (i.e., no spill-over effect), the right- to -work penalty is larger (see Table 3). In fact, we find that living near a non -
RTW state helps raise workers' wages. 3
There may be reasons why states choose to adopt right -to-work laws that this analysis fails to address. It may be that the wage structure or industry mix within a state helps determine why state legislatures or voters adopt right-to- work laws. To control for this, we estimate a series of regressions that model a state's decision to adopt right -to-work. Both Wessels (1981) and Moore et al. (1986) have designed models that consider the endogeneity of right-to-work law, and find that "once the influence of wages in the passage of RTW laws is accounted for, RTW laws have no independent effect on wages" (Moore 1998, 459). We estimate the probability of a state passing a RTW law using mean and median wages as well as other state-level demographic characteristics. We then use these estimated values in a two-stage least -squares estimation. Even after correcting for endogeneity in this way, we find that RTW laws have statistically significant and negative impacts on workers living in right-to-work states.
Conclusion
The Wage Penalty of "Right-to-Work" Laws | EPI DataZone
The most important aspect of right -to-work law is its effect on wages. That there have only been a handful of studies directly assessing the impact of these laws on workers' earnings is surprising. What research there is on the subject is mixed, with findings critically dependent on model specification. Unlike most research up to this point, this analysis focuses on the impact of regional costs of living and finds that workers living in RTW states earn significantly less than workers living in non-RTW states. We also find that care must be taken in examining the true effect of right-to-work legislation.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the effect of RTW legislation can be found in those metropolitan areas that occupy both RTW and non-RTW states. In these cases, estimating the effects separately indicates that workers living in these metropolitan areas are helped by the higher earnings typical of the non- RTW state.
Endnotes
1. Currently the following states have right -to -work laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
2. Inter -state and intra-state cost of living controls are based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development "Fair Market Rents" for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). We use the 45th percentile in each MSA.
3. To test the robustness of these results, we estimate a model that combines both state-level indicators, regional indicators, and costs of living variables as well as all the control variables listed in model (1). In this combined model we find that both the pure right-to-work effect and the total right-to-work effect are - 1.9% and -1.7%, respectively; in neither case are the estimates statistically different from zero. As with other estimates that include a measure of cost of living (COL), we find these estimates to be sensitive to the particular COL measure and unreliable since we have no faith in any particular measure of COL.
References
Bennett, J.T. 2001. Right To Work - Prescription for Prosperity and Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Labor Relations Research. Dumond,
J.M., B.T. Hirsch, and D.A. MacPherson. 1999. Wage Differentials Across Labor Markets and Workers: Does Cost of Living Matter? Economic Inquiry. Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 577-98.
Farber, H. S. 1985. "The Extent of Unionization in the United States." in Thomas Kochan, ed., Challenges and Choices Facing American Unions Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Moore, W. J., and R.J. Newman. 1985. The Effects of Fright -to-Work Laws: A Review of the Literature. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 571 -85.
Moore, W.J. 1998. The Determinants and Effects of Right -To-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature. Journal of Labor Research Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 449-69.
Moore, W.J., J.A. Dunlevy, and R.J. Newman. 1986. Do Right -to -Work Laws Matter? Comment. Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 515 -24.
Wessels, W.J. 1981. Economic Effects of Right to Work Laws. Journal of Labor Research. Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 55-75.
The Wage Penalty of "Right-to-Work" Laws | EPI DataZone
Table 1. Right-to-Work Differential
Model   Model   Model 123
Mean Effect   -6.50%   -7.80%   -3.80% t-statistic   -27.1   -2.51   -15.22
(1) model has no state controls (see above for regressors), but controls for worker characteristics. (2) model adds state controls (3) model with MSA level cost of living controls
Table 2. Estimates of Mean Effect of RTW states for Men and Women:
male
Mean Effect   -6.10% t-statistic   -17.74
female
-6.80% -20.79
male
-7.80% -1.82
female
-6.80% -20.79
male
-3.70% -10.42
female
-3.70% -11.01
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
(1) model has no state controls (see above for regressors), but controls for worker characteristics. (2) model adds state controls (3) model with MSA level cost of living controls
Table 3. Right-to-Work Differential – Pure Right-to-Work Effect.
Model   Model   Model 123
Mean Effect   -6.8   -11.7   -4.1 t-statistic   -28.09   -4.11   -16.07
(1) model has no state controls (see above for regressors), but controls for worker characteristics. (2) model adds state controls (3) model with MSA level cost of living controls

[Palehorse]

Role of National Right to Work in the Anti-Union Network
National Right to Work is the country's oldest organization dedicated solely to destroying unions. Its network consists of four organizations that share leadership, offices, resources and staff, all with the common goal of undermining workers' freedom of association.  To carry out this mission, the National Right to Work Committee employs over 200 staff to lobby, fundraise, distribute propaganda, and interfere with workers' union organizing efforts, and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation employs nearly 50 staff for its litigation efforts.1

While the organization has doggedly pursued an anti-union agenda for a half century, its public profile has recently been eclipsed by the big-budget anti-union front group the Center for Union Facts .   

Does National Right to Work have anything to do with right-to-work laws?
When anti-union ideologues lost an effort to enact a national law weakening unions, they created the National Right to Work Committee in 1955 to pass such laws at the state level.  The group's single-minded focus of doing away with unions was as unambiguous then, as it is today, however the name it shares with the very legislation it was created to pass, is purposely confusing.  For more background on this deceptively-titled legislation, click here .

What is the True Agenda Behind National Right to Work?
Does National Right to Work advocate on behalf of workers?
The group claims to be a "worker advocate."2  But the organization doesn't concern itself with improving workers' job conditions, benefits, or treatment.  An examination of press releases issued by the National Right to Work Foundation between 2003 and 2005 reveals there was no discussion by the group of improving benefits for workers, better working conditions, or workplace dignity; and only one reference to increasing wages. There were, however, 267 negative references to unions.

"The terrorist could then use his influence with the union to make it easier for a terrorist colleague to board a plane or to get a bomb through baggage screening."
- National Right to Work's warning that an airport screeners' union could be infiltrated by terrorists32

If National Right to Work is really advocating for workers, why is does it refuse to disclose its donors?
Whose interests are they really fighting for?  The funding trail that exists points to anti-union businesses:3
A lawsuit revealed that 84 percent of the National Right to Work Committee's 1973 budget was funded by corporations, and other employers.4
Early known donors include:

Wofford Camp who served on a U.S. Chamber of Commerce committee and was a California grower who fought efforts by farm workers to organize unions.5
Roger Milliken, former president of Milliken & Company, who shut down one of his southern textile plants as retaliation against his employees' vote to form a union.6
The Foundation bragged that "over 350 Presidents and Chairmen of the Board listed in Dun & Bradstreet's Directory of Million Dollar Corporations," were associated with it.7
Anti-union companies indirectly fund National Right to Work through foundations.  The network has received major grants from the Walton Family Foundation (funded with profits from Wal-Mart), Castle Rock Foundation (funded with profits from Coors beer), and Publix Super Markets Charities.8
The group's original leadership also suggests an anti-union agenda shaped by the interest of employers.  For instance, the Committee's first chairman of the board was Edwin Dillard, president of Old Dominion Box Company, who vehemently fought his workers' efforts to organize his company's plants in the South.9  Fred Hartley, the Committee's first president, was the former Congressman who sponsored the Taft-Hartley Act amending the National Labor Relations Act to expand employers' rights, not workers.

http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/the-anti-union-network/national-right-to-work/national-right-to-work.html

[Henry Hawk]

It appears to me that you want to post lengthy articles...and bury the plain and simple truth of this bill....let's not make more out of it than it is.

American Rights at Work Education Fund is an outreach organization dedicated to promoting the freedom of workers to form unions and bargain collectively.

HUH, go figure...

bump!

All Gov Walker is wanting to do is:


• Restricts public employees from negotiating everything except their wage

• Does not affect police and fire workers

• Limits wage increases to the rate of inflation

• Requires any larger wage increase to be approved by referendum

• Requires public employees to pay 5.8 percent of their pensions and 12 percent of their health care benefits

• Requires that collective bargaining units take annual votes to maintain certification as a union

• Prohibits employers from collecting union dues

• Releases members of collective bargaining units from dues paying requirements

• Authorizes restructuring of principal payments in the current budget for general obligation bonds, reducing debt payment costs by $165 million

• Increases general revenue for Medicaid to cover an estimated $153 million deficit

• Provides $22 million to address shortfalls in the prisons budget

• Authorizes the Department of Administration to sell state heating plants, with the net proceeds deposited in the budget stabilization fund

[me]

I'm afraid your point is going to be a moot point if teachers are laid off because the state can't afford to pay them.  What will be gained by that?  The union doesn't care because the laid off teacher still has to pay dues.

[Palehorse]

Lengthy articles that contain the details that support my view that ALL of this RTW legislation being forced upon the citizens of this state and others, is WRONG!

It is documented, proven, and FACTUAL information that has been compiled by respected professional and educational institutions of higher learning.

But as usual, you won't read it, much less give it any consideration what so ever. You just roll your eyes and push forward with the job killing, worker killing, quality of life killing, wage killing, propaganda being proliferated by the corporate shill republicans! 

[Palehorse]

. . .  The union doesn't care because the laid off teacher still has to pay dues.

Source????